

Overview: Historiography
of the
Disintegration of Yugoslavia

Michael J. Gilbert

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Dr. Greg A. Smith

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Part 1: Categories

The casual geography or history student who may attempt to describe the disintegration of Yugoslavia might be able to tell you that Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic time bomb, or another communist block country waiting to fall apart with the fall of communism. Of course historians have treated this topic as being infinitely more complex, and so it is. The resulting war which followed the disintegration of the Yugoslav¹ state garners most of the western press, with stories of rampant Serb nationalism, Serb war crimes, and ethnic cleansing by Serbs. The reality was that there was plenty of this kind of violence and anger to go around during the war and therefore historians have become fascinated with the underlying reasons behind all of this hatred. Though there are numerous histories about the wars themselves, studying the histories of the backgrounds, events, and attitudes that led up to the wars is my primary goal. Some of the questions historians ask themselves before studying this topic include: were the seeds of the breakdown inherent in the creation of the second Yugoslav state after World War II or were there ancient irreconcilable differences in the people of the area that just could not be avoided? Was Josip Broz (Marshal) Tito, the only man capable of holding his creation together, or were his unbridled foreign loan payments a burden on Yugoslavia which further stressed already strained ideas of national unity? These of course are false dichotomies, and very simplistic ones as well, but historians and social scientists have seriously considered these and various other reasons why the large Balkan state fractured into seven independent states by 2009 rather than remain a powerful South European state and why it was so bloody and vicious a breakup.

The difficulty in writing about the historiography of the breakup of Yugoslavia is that it is still a live issue. It was only in 2008 that Kosovo was recognized as an independent nation and

¹ “Yugoslav” literally means “South Slav.”

Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a federation with three strong nationalist republics that could potentially divide that former Yugoslav republic even further. Therefore much of the history that has been done on the topic still contains a wait and see attitude which makes it hard to splice the political theory from the history. One of the leading scholars on this topic is Jasna Dragović-Soso, an expert in Eastern European studies who developed categories of explanations that political and social theorist have used to explain the breakup. The historical interpretations about the topic also seem to approach it in one or more of these categories as well, so it is worth thinking about her list of explanations for our purpose:

1. Explanations focused on the *longue durée*, emphasizing “ancient hatreds,” a “clash of civilizations,” or the legacy of imperial rule in the Balkans.
2. Explanations focused on the historical legacy of the 19th century South Slav national ideologies and the first Yugoslav state-building experiment from 1918 to 1941
3. Explanations focused on the legacy of Yugoslavia’s socialist system, its constitutional development and federal structure, its ideological delegitimation, and its economic failure.
4. Explanations focused on the period of Yugoslavia’s breakdown in the second half of the 1980’s and the role of political and intellectual agency.
5. Explanations focused on the impact of external factors.²

Each of these descriptions of explanation needs a short explanation itself. The first description refers to the coexistence of different cultures and nations in this region. Though it is more complicated than just stating that Croats and Slovenes are Catholic, Serbs are Orthodox

² Jasna Dragović-Soso, “From *Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate?*” in *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe*, Ed. Lenard J. Cohen & Jasna Dragović-Soso (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2008), 2.

Christians, Bosnians are Muslims, and so on, there is a general sense in the Balkans that the people who live there have very different cultural values that have caused conflict in the region.

The second explanation looks at the attempts made after World War I to make a truly unified country in this region. After the war, the Austro-Hungarian Empire no longer existed and as a consequence the Balkan states were left to establish a new independent state somehow. This “somehow” ended up being the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes which then became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929.³ The big question in the interwar years was: without the cohesion the imperial policeman presented in the region, was there incentive enough to put the cultural differences aside and develop a strong multi-ethnic nation? This period for historians of this topic is usually stressed as being a fundamental part of the disintegration because of the strengthening of nationalist movements like the Ustaše and Greater Serbia.⁴

Those who lean toward the third category like Valerie Bunce in their scholarship emphasize the socialist state that emerged after World War II as a sort of catalyst that perpetuated nationalist feelings by allowing the separate republics within Yugoslavia to “construct” nations.⁵ Dragović-Soso goes on to explain Bunce’s view by stating, “...by the late 1970’s it [Yugoslavia] was in her view, essentially confederal, thus pitting the (strong) republics against each other, not against a weakened centre.”⁶ Note that the strong republics she is referring to are Croatia and Serbia, by far the holding majority of seats in Belgrade and accounting for a large portion of the population. Within this explanation is the idea that the individual effort of Marshal Tito held the nation together by his strong attachment to “Yugoslavism” and by

³ Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 24.

⁴ Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course, and Consequences* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 41.

⁵ Bunce, as explained by Jasna Dragović-Soso, “Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate?” 10.

⁶ Ibid.

demonizing “nationalism after the Second World War.”⁷ The view goes that when Tito died in 1980, his personality and leadership could not hold back these nations that had grown strong under socialism from a conflict.

The forth type of approach focuses on the rise of the nationalist intellectuals in Belgrade. This seems to be of particular interest to Dragović-Soso because in Aleksandar Pavković’s review article of her book *Saviours of the Nation: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism*, he argues against her thesis that Serbian intellectuals called out for a renewed and recharged brand of Serbian nationalism in the late 1980’s. Pavković states: “In short, there are grounds for doubt that in the period of 1985-89 a majority or even a substantial number of Serb liberal or neo-Marxist dissident intellectuals abandoned their previous political principles or views in favour of a Serb nationalist platform couched in the traditional terminology of Serb victimization.”⁸ Yet, the fact that she devoted an entire book to this subject and other scholars have given serious looks at this subject of interest seems to indicate that this forth category is important when writing about the history of the breakup.

Dragović-Soso’s fifth category, outside influences, looks at how international policy influenced the breakup and to what degree. She mentions that the more study that has been put into this last category of her list, the more it becomes apparent that outside factors played a major role in the breakup.⁹ Paul Shoup, who along with Nick Miller is a contributor to Cohen and Dragović-Soso’s book, notes that it was the West’s “lack of engagement with Yugoslavia during the 1980s” especially with the collapse of communism that at the very least allowed the violent

⁷ Nick Miller. “From *Return Engagement: Intellectuals and Nationalism in Tito’s Yugoslavia*” in *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe*, Ed. Lenard J. Cohen & Jasna Dragović-Soso (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2008), 179.

⁸ Aleksandar Pavković, “The Origins of Contemporary Serb Nationalism: Yet Another Case of *trahison des clercs*?” *The Slavonic and East European Review*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4213851>.

⁹ Dragović-Soso “Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate?” 23.

disintegration of Yugoslavia.¹⁰ There was also a notion that with Tito's death, Yugoslavia no longer had someone strong enough to ignore Soviet pressure and reach out to the West. This was especially important in the republics, like Croatia and Slovenia that leaned towards a more democratic and westerly direction.¹¹

Now I hope the reader has a clearer understanding of the approaches, according to Dragović-Soso, scholars have taken in explaining this event. While there is no doubt that any history of this topic strictly adheres to just one category, with the exception of the Cohen-Dragović-Soso anthology where the scholars are asked to do so, we can assume that the other histories cover a couple, if not all of the categories in some respect or another. The next section of this work will look at several books and articles and their take on one or more of the above categories. This should give us a broad overview of how historians and other social scientist view the events and attitudes that led to June of 1991 when Croatia and Slovenia split away from Yugoslavia and started the physical break up of, as my Bosnian friend put it, “a respected country,” into seven weak nations in Southeastern Europe.

Part 2: Histories

Even the least observant traveler who journeyed across what used to be Yugoslavia rapidly discovered that history and geography divided the lands of the south Slavs. From Slovenia in the north to Macedonia in the south every region was distinct, each fiercely proud of its own traditions, culture and past. Wars, especially the Turkish thrust through the Balkans, and multinational empires have shaped the destinies of the south Slavs and the evolution of their lands—lands in which, even today, several cultures and peoples live side by side, where east meets west, Islam confronts Christianity and Catholicism comes up against Orthodoxy.¹²

Witnessing the region in the summer of 2009, I could not write a clearer description of the region than Bennett does. This fact is so apparent to some of the authors that it is not even

¹⁰ Paul Shoup. “From *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Western Foreign Policy in the 1980s*” in *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe*, 333.

¹¹ Dragović-Soso “Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate?” 23.

¹² Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 16.

mentioned, it is assumed knowledge that the different peoples that inhabited the region lived side by side with culturally and ethnically dissimilar neighbors. Even today, in post-war¹³ former Yugoslavia there are areas where one can cross a mountain or river and go from a village with a Croat majority to a village with a Serbian majority, from the Latin alphabet to the Cyrillic in a matter of minutes. In all the historical works that do attempt an all encompassing history of the topic, this basic information about the region is presented as the background to all the subsequent history that they cover. The next step of the scholar is to answer the question: How did this idea of Yugoslavia emerge? It seems to be the general view by scholars that Yugoslavism started to develop in the 18th and 19th century as the south Slavs tended to unite against the larger empires that ruled the region.¹⁴ There is also a consensus that Yugoslavism was being realized by the emergence of a relatively strong Serbian state which made military gains in Macedonia by pushing out the declining Ottomans in the Balkan Wars only a year before the outbreak of World War 1.¹⁵ The Croats and Slovenes, who like Serbia, were subject to the Austro-Hungarian Empire thus began to entertain thoughts of a strong Serbia that could unite the Slavs and win independence from the Austro-Hungarians.¹⁶ Whether the scholars treat the “ancient” cultural and ethnical differences or not, there is an underlying theme in all the histories and analysis done on the breakup of Yugoslavia that the distinctions between the peoples were real and undermining the cohesiveness of the state. We shall discover that in all of the following categories, these distinctions will pop up frequently. But before leaving this Dragović-Soso category by looking at the interwar period, I insist that the scholarship on the of role religion as

¹³ Common term is “Yugoslav Wars” (1991-2001).

¹⁴ Bennett, Cohen, and Denitch establish this in their first chapters of their respective books. Cohen uses a quote of Franjo Tudjman, 1st President of Croatia, which explains Yugoslavism as what brought Croats and Serbs together by “common interests” and ultimately drove them apart by “contrasting impact of the common Yugoslav state on their national beings”. *Broken Bonds*, 1.

¹⁵ Bennett. *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 23.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

an underlying active agent in the disintegration must be addressed as it too is important “background” in the works on this topic.

To review, there are three generalities that are useful when thinking of religion in the western Balkans. Ethnic lines are almost synonymous with religious lines even when modern scholars write about the religions of this region. Croats and Slovenes are Roman Catholics, Serbs Montenegrins and a majority of Macedonians, Eastern Orthodox and Bosnians, Albanians, and a significant minority of Macedonians, Muslim. Things become even more muddled when we consider that there are pockets of each ethnic group interspersed among the entire region. For example there are Bosnian Serbs who are Orthodox Christians living in Bosnia, Serbian Albanians who are Muslims living in parts of Serbia.¹⁷ While these distinctions can be confusing, the religions that most concern historians when examining Yugoslavia and its disintegration tend to center on radical Catholicism and radical Orthodoxy and their responses to each other and to the Islamic minority in the region. Mark Biondich is a historian that has concentrated on the role of radical Catholicism in the inter-war years. He argues that extreme nationalist groups like the Ustaše helped polarize factions within post WWII Yugoslavia.¹⁸ In Bennett’s history he makes us aware of violence against the Muslims well before the WWI that resurfaced in WWII and then again in the Yugoslav Wars.¹⁹ Sociologist Sergej Flere’s examination of a “Yugoslavian civil religion” looks at the role of religion in a different way. His historical view of religion contends that a new religion was created in post WWII Yugoslavia that served to hold the country together and that when Tito died, this civil religion fell into

¹⁷ The clearest example of this would be that of Kosovo before independence.

¹⁸ Mark Biondich, “Radical Catholicism and Fascism in Croatia, 1918-1945,” *Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions* 8, no.2 (2007): 396, <http://0-web.ebscohost.com>.

¹⁹ Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse*, 23.

disrepair.²⁰ Biondich and Flere's articles are specifically aimed at religious aspects of the breakup, but as I mentioned and as the reader will realize, religion will be a key component in understanding the histories that have been written on this subject.

Now let us look briefly at how scholars have treated what Dragović-Soso calls "the first Yugoslav state-building experiment."²¹ The theme that Biondich stresses in his contribution to *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe* is that post WWI Yugoslavia, first called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, remained united despite nationalist tensions to enable it to resist its common enemies.²² Biondich and the other sources tell us that after WWI, Serbia had emerged as the dominant power in the region and that the Croats and Slovenes especially looked to them in the early 20's for support against Italy. Italy had been promised territory in Dalmatia by the allies during WWI and after the war, they had come to collect, annexing many islands and even landing on the Croatian mainland. This particular encroachment is seen by historians of Yugoslavia as being an integral ingredient in tying the first Yugoslavia together in the inter-war period. Bennett points out that the leadership of the kingdom was also a factor in holding the multi-ethnic state together. He explains an episode when in 1925; King Alexander celebrated the 1000th anniversary of the coronation of King Tomislav of Croatia to cheering crowds of Croats, even naming the prince Tomislav.²³ Bennett, Cohen, and Biondich also assert that the assassination of King Alexander in Marseille by a Macedonian gunman in league with the Ustaše, actually helped the country maintain its unity.²⁴ Cohen goes further to state that the reaction to Alexander's assassination "demonstrated that there was some popular sympathy for

²⁰ Sergej Flere, "The Broken Covenant of Tito's People: The Problem of Civil Religion in Communist Yugoslavia," *East European Politics and Societies* 21, no. 4 (2007): 688, <http://0-web.ebscohost.com>.

²¹ See page 3.

²² Biondich. "From *The Historical Legacy*" in *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe*, 66.

²³ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 33.

²⁴ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 39. And Biondich, *The Historical Legacy*, 63.

resolving the Serbian-Croatian impasse and for finding a mutually satisfactory model of governance.”²⁵ Cohen also adds that, “The assassination... revealed the strong undercurrent of ethnic extremism seething beneath the regime’s contrived and superficial Yugoslavism.”²⁶ Biondich, while referring to the years immediately before WWII concludes: “Only the threat of war and the possibility of invasion in 1939 compelled the political elites (i.e., the regency and the HSS [Croatian Peasant Party]) to compromise, but even then agreement was contested on all sides by broad sections of political and intellectual opinion.”²⁷ These ideas which Biondich and Cohen share illustrate that within this period there was a recognizable element within Yugoslavia that would manifest itself not only in the final breakup of Yugoslavia, but the brutality of WWII in the region. Bennett on the other hand disagrees on the point that the relations between the nationalities in the interwar years resulted in the butchery of WWII. He bases his argument on the facts that the Croats and Slovenes were happy with the arrangement that let them enjoy their own language, not German or Hungarian, and could use the state run schools that the Kingdom offered them instead of seeking education in the capitols of the former empire.²⁸ One thing scholars can agree on is that WWII brought a bloody and abrupt end to the first Yugoslavia.

Though Dragović-Soso leaves WWII out of her categories, and the sources go into very little detail when looking at it in the context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, it is assumed that the ancient hatreds and radical nationalism along with outside influences caused much turmoil in the region as in much of the rest of Europe. In an admittedly gross oversimplification, the sources agree that a multi-ethnic communist group led by Tito who called themselves “Partisans” developed in the Balkans during the course of the war. The Partisans fought against

²⁵ Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 17.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Biondich, *The Historical Legacy*, 66.

²⁸ Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse*. 33.

the fascist allies of Germany including the “Ustaše”, and anti-communist Serbs who took the patriotic name “Četniks.”²⁹ Bennett sums the conclusion of the war for the region up this way, “Tito’s partisans had liberated their country...virtually on their own. Despite assurances to Britain and the United States that he would cooperate with Yugoslavia’s royal government ... Tito had no intention of sharing power.”³⁰ Thus the second experiment in Yugoslavism would begin with Tito’s socialist regime and the histories of the third category.

Audrey Helfant Budding tells us “Article 1 of the 1946 Constitution defined Yugoslavia as a state founded upon each people’s ‘right to self-determination, including the right of separation.’”³¹ Yet, despite this article giving any of the nations within Yugoslavia’s borders the right to secede, the republic endured for 45 years. Cohen notes that socialist economic methods of promoting Yugoslavism were to spur economic development and spread the wealth of the more developed regions.³² In fact, the theme of collective economic strength in this period is generally believed by the Scholars looking back at this period as one of the main cohesive factors, and its decline in the 70’s and 80’s as a mitigating cause of the final breakup. Overall, scholars hold this general notion, that as long as there were benefits to being a strong centralized republic, then the old differences could be forgotten. Adding to this, it is important not to forget Sergej Flere’s argument for a Yugoslavian civil religion in this period. Flere sees this civil religion with its own “Origin and Sacred History” and its own Eschatology as important mechanisms that helped promote Yugoslav values in the face of nationalist sentiments.³³

²⁹ Ustaše and Četnik take various spellings among the sources and in different time periods can take on different meanings. For instance, Stevan K. Pavlowitch tells us that Četnik “a word used originally by marauders in the Dinaric mountains and eventually by all armed bands of the central Balkans at the beginning of the twentieth century.” “From *The Legacy of Two World Wars*” in *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe*, 81.

³⁰ Bennett, *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse*, 50.

³¹ Audrey Helfant Budding, “From *Nation/People/Republic*” in *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe*, 99.

³² Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 28.

³³ Sergej Flere, *The Broken Covenant of Tito’s People*, 685-688.

Especially important to Flere and a fact that is generally acknowledged by most scholars in this field is that it was Tito's charisma that played the largest part in promoting Yugoslavism. Flere writes that after the ideological split with Stalin in 1948, "the political system increasingly relied on his charisma as the ultimate source of political guidance and arbitration, particularly in resolving inter-ethnic and inter-republic disputes."³⁴ This power Tito had over the majority of the Yugoslavian population made it possible for him to personally quell nationalist uprisings when they did occur. The prime example Bennett and others point to is the so-called "Croatian Spring," a movement started by a group of intellectuals to make Croatian the official language of Croatia that morphed into an all out Croatian nationalist movement for greater autonomy from Belgrade.³⁵ This movement helps to support Budding's article in that self-determinism which was officially encouraged was an idea that some groups took seriously. Tito's solution to the problem on Croat nationalism and nationalism in general was to purge nationalist leaders from the communist party and then create a new constitution in 1974 that acknowledged the greater autonomy of each republic within Yugoslavia.³⁶ This action is seen by Budding and others as perpetuating resentment and divergence in Yugoslavia's nationalist parties who were now minorities in their own governments.³⁷ The strange result of Tito's measures is that by trying to suppress and at the same time please the republics, he ended up creating the problems that would lead to the breakup after his death. Bennett argues that after the new constitution that Tito had hoped would promote Yugoslavism by creating a more effective governing system, the opposite happened, "All republics and provinces were guilty of pursuing their own 'national', rather than Yugoslav, economic goals, often at the expense of the rest of the federation. Double capacity

³⁴ Ibid., 689.

³⁵ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 72-73.

³⁶ Ibid., 74.

³⁷ Budding, *Nation/People/Republic*, 103. Bennett also reports that this reaction placed minority Serb-Croats and Serb-Kosovars in positions of disproportionate power within the Communist Party of each republic.

and even protectionism between republics were features of Yugoslavia's economic landscape."³⁸

All the histories agree that Tito's death in 1980 and the ineffective leadership at all levels of Yugoslavian government created the turbulent political and economic crisis that will be discussed in the next category.

Dragović-Soso's forth category of explanations is by far the most documented and confusing for the average reader. Bennett, Cohen, Denitch, Miller, and Michael Palairret³⁹ go into great detail on the social, economic, and political situation in Yugoslavia up to the official outbreak of hostilities in 1991. Cohen sums up the economic situation: "According to official figures, salaries in the country dropped by 24 percent in 1988 and living conditions plunged to the level of the mid-1960s."⁴⁰ He concludes that "by late 1989 the rising pattern of intraelite mistrust had acquired more serious significance owing to the deep economic crisis, the sharply divergent strategies for political reform, and the absence of a powerful pan-ethnic authority [Tito]..."⁴¹ Another key factor for examining this period is the rise of Slobodan Milošević and the rise of Serbian control of the federal government in Belgrade.⁴² Bennett warns us about Milošević's intentions by stating, "His driving force was an overwhelming lust for power, not visions of a Greater Serbia, and for that reason he was far more dangerous than a nationalist."⁴³ Despite his individual intentions, the researchers agree that Milošević's rise in the Belgrade throughout the 80's and this program of a Greater Serbia or as Bennett calls it "The New Serb Nationalism" were important dynamics in the years leading up to the breakup because these dynamics threatened to eclipse the principles of self-determinism which the other republics still

³⁸ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*. 75.

³⁹ Contributor to Cohen and Dragović-Soso's *State Collapse in South Eastern Europe*.

⁴⁰ Cohen. *Broken Bonds*, 45.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁴² Note that due to Tito's reforms mentioned earlier, the Yugoslavian government's main function was foreign policy and the JNA (Yugoslav's Peoples Army).

⁴³ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*. 83.

adhered to. One interesting view to this is within Nick Miller's contribution that I cited earlier. He mentions that for Croatia in this period, Croats that had left to the West, mainly in Canada and the U.S. in the 60's and 70's as a result of Tito's managing of the Croatian Spring, helped start a democratic movement that turned into a nationalist movement to counter Serb domination.⁴⁴ The historians agree with Miller that such nationalist movements grew from intellectual movements usually concentrated in the Capitols of each republic, even in Belgrade, and became a very important element in the breakup. To conclude the examination of history writing of in this category, Denitch mentions a declaration made in early 1991 by 4 out of 6 of the other republics: They would stay in Yugoslavia only if it becomes a much looser confederation where no republic could be outvoted by any combination of the others. The alternative was secession and/or a civil war."⁴⁵ The detail that scholars devote to this period as I mentioned at the beginning of this section is a clear indicator of two things, the importance they place on the political and intellectual currents of this period and also the amount of source material that became available to the West at this time. The next category of history writing will focus on how much the West and for that matter; the Soviet Union influenced Yugoslavia and its breakup.

We have already seen in the histories of this topic how outside influences have affected the creation and resilience of the Yugoslav state in the 1st Yugoslavia and in the second socialist state. I have also recently mentioned Miller's assertion that western influenced intellectualism also played a role in the breakup. Something I have yet to mention is the views historians like Bennett and Shoup take in their inspections of foreign influences. Not surprisingly, Tito's relationship with the West (especially the U.S.) and the Soviet Union are of great interests to

⁴⁴ Miller, *Return Engagement*, 191-192.

⁴⁵ Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism*, 125.

them in their respective works. Amid post-WWII Europe, Yugoslavia had appeared to be on the course of other Eastern bloc countries in the region. Instead, according to Bennett, Tito and Yugoslavia were kicked out of the communist brotherhood because of Stalin's inability to control Tito.⁴⁶ Seeing an opportunity to drive a wedge between two communist states, the U.S. gladly lent Yugoslavia money to develop their economy and military starting in the late 40s.⁴⁷ In addition to receiving money from the West, Tito, realizing that his position between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be used to his advantage, adopted a policy of Non-Alignment in 1961. Upon this, Bennett tells us "Tito and his successors became expert at raising the spectre of the Soviet bogey to procure yet more economic assistance. The result was communist extravagance paid for by a seemingly endless supply of Western credit."⁴⁸ Bennett and Shoup's conclusions are that the money the West was giving Yugoslavia was being terrible mismanaged and that right up to the separation in 1991, aid was pouring in from the West in hopes of avoiding a conflict.⁴⁹ Finally, there was the expectation by democratic powers within the former Yugoslavia that when war did start in the region, the West support their efforts. Bennett and Shoup both assert that in post-Cold War Europe, the West had little incentive to support a democratic up rising and in the case of the U.S., a united Yugoslavia was still preferable to struggles for democracy.⁵⁰ Shoup goes further by adding that the only interest the West had in Yugoslavia was on matters of the picture that Bennett and Shoup seem to paint for their readers is that after the disintegration of socialism in Yugoslavia, the country was left to handle its own problems. Even though the U.S.

⁴⁶ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 58.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 59. and Shoup, *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Western Foreign Policy*, 337. Bennett's numbers are \$20 million in aid initially, reaching \$2 billion "by 1960 in non-repayable Western aid." Shoups numbers are \$750 million in military aid and another \$275 million in financial aid between the 50s and early 60s.

⁴⁸ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 59-60.

⁴⁹ Shoup, *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Western Foreign Policy*, 336-337. Shoup states that aid from Russia to the JNA was provided in anticipation of Western intervention.

⁵⁰ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 154. And Shoup, *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Western Foreign Policy*, 338-339. Croatia and Slovenia were told by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, that their countries would not be recognized by the U.S. if they declared independence.

had hoped that a Yugoslavian democracy would develop, the infamous result was the fracturing of the republic by way of nationalist struggle and all out war.⁵¹ These points on foreign influences are the most frequently discussed points that historians and other scholars have examined in the history of Yugoslavia's breakup and conclude our look at the history writing within the fifth and final category.

Conclusions

The historiography on this topic is of an analytical approach, and is written by scholars of the "New History" type. The main reason for this is rather obvious; the events that these histories covered are relatively recent and well document. In some cases the authors are not only researching the history of their topic, but were participants in it.⁵² The approaches the authors take reflect a wide range of interdisciplinary interests. For instance, Lenard Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso are professors of International Studies, Sergej Flere, is a professor of Sociology, and Aleksander Pavković is an associate professor of Politics and International Relations. Though the articles I chose focus on only one or more of the principle historiography types: political, cultural, economic, or social, the larger works that we have reviewed in my work make an honest attempt at covering all the types.⁵³ Furthermore, the basic framework provided by Dragović-Soso ensures that the multi-disciplinary contributors in *State Collapse* will also cover the topic thoroughly from many different angles. As is also true with the principles of the "new history," it is not just the aim of the authors to record facts; it is also their aim to find causation without crossing the line into determinism. There is a special consideration that needs to be

⁵¹ Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 155.

⁵² Christopher Bennett studied in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and early 90s. Bogdan Denitch was a Serbian émigré to the U.S. that maintained a home on the island of Brač during the socialist and war time Yugoslavia years. He was also among the intellectuals in the capitols I referred to in the forth category. From *Ethnic Nationalism*, 173-179.

⁵³ Here I refer to Bennett, Cohen, Biondich, and the Cohen- Dragović-Soso anthology.

made when examining the history writing on this topic in particular. That consideration, which I pointed out in the introduction, is that for many of the scholars and the people involved in this region, this topic remains a live issue. Therefore I argue that the authors that I have presented wrote these histories not with the main interest of filling a historical void, but that they hope that their history writing will promote better understanding of a volatile state of affairs for themselves and a world audience.

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